Reformed (Islamic) Epistemology: al-Ghazālī, Skepticism, and Properly Basic Beliefs

The annual Philosophy talk in the Marmura Lecture Series, honouring Professor Marmura's own specialization. Professor Jon McGinnis, who has just joined the University of Toronto, will bring al-Ghazālī's skepticism and mysticism to contemporary debates in the philosophy of religion –particularly about what counts as evidence for religious beliefs.

Abstract
The 'Evidentialist Objection' maintains that there simply is not sufficient evidence to justify belief in God. Of course, the objection can be extended to a whole host of religious beliefs. The problem is not new, and in its extended form, namely, justifying religious beliefs more generally, it was as much at issue in the medieval Islamic world as it is among contemporary philosophers of religion today. The presentation considers this medieval Islamic manifestation of the Evidentialist Objection, its context, and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s response. That response, however, can only be appreciated by considering Ghazālī's travel from skepticism to certainty and a rethinking of what count as ‘properly basic’ beliefs, a position that resonates well with the recent reformed epistemology of certain contemporary philosophers of religion.

Bio
Jon McGinnis is Professor of classical and medieval philosophy at the University of Toronto. One of his more recent research interests is in theories of the justification of belief among medieval Islamicate philosophers and theologians. In addition to numerous articles, he is the author of Avicenna (OUP 2010), translator and editor of Avicenna’s Physics from his encyclopedic work, The Healing (Brigham Young University Press, 2009) and co-translator with David C. Reisman of Classical Arabic Philosophy, An Anthology of Sources (Hackett Publishing Co., 2007).

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